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Abstract 
The thesis compared the likelihood of taking risks in dyads and individuals in 
varying situations.  Patterns of risky decision making were examined in the standard risky 
choice task and a novel risk management task.  The relative successes of two theories of 
risky decision making were assessed:  Prospect Theory emphasizes perceptual and 
psychophysical processes, whereas Security-Potential/Aspiration Level Theory 
emphasizes dispositional and motivational processes.  The thesis also examined dyads’ 
decision behavior in light of competing social influence perspectives regarding risky 
versus cautious shifts and group polarization.   
Participants, as individuals or as part of a dyad, made decisions in 23 trials about 
hypothetical two-outcome monetary gambles in one of two different tasks.  Risky choice 
involved making choices between two given 50-50 lotteries which varied in riskiness 
(i.e., outcome variability), whereas risk management required actively manipulating an 
existing 50-50 risk by changing outcome values. The 23 trials were equivalent across 
tasks.  Dyad participants communicated via an instant messenger program, while viewing 
the same lotteries on different computers. Data on risk preferences across gain and loss 
domains were analyzed using a mixed factorial ANOVA design. 
Consistent with Prospect Theory value function predictions, the risky choice task 
led to risk averse preferences for gains and risk seeking preferences for losses, though 
risk seeking was weak.  Consistent with SP/A theory predictions, the risk management 
task led to overall risk averse preferences, with movement toward risk taking for gains.  
vi 
 
In addition, there was some evidence of social influences in that dyads tended to be more 
conservative than individuals in their decision behavior when dealing with undesirable 
outcomes.  Thus, a cautious shift was observed, but only for lotteries involving 
guaranteed losses.  This could not be explained by group polarization. 
Each of the theories received some support, but none of them could explain all of 
the findings.  Recommendations were made to give greater attention to defining and 
measuring risk attitudes and dispositions, and to continue exploring differences in 
decision situations and social settings to obtain a more comprehensive understanding of 
risky decision making processes. Findings here suggest the need for an overarching 
theory that can account for a wide variety of influences. A dual processes approach was 
recommended as one promising avenue. Social and situational influences may prove an 
essential part of understanding risky decision making in real life contexts.   
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Introduction 
In real life decision making, individuals often make decisions with another 
person. Be it a spouse, a parent, a sibling, a friend, a colleague, dyad decision making is 
common. Much attention has been devoted to studying dyadic interactions and behavior 
in a variety of contexts. The game theory framework provides insight into human 
cooperative and competitive tendencies in any of a variety of strategic situations with 
well-defined rules (e.g., Camerer, 2003). The medical decision making literature 
addresses issues of shared decision making typically between a patient and his or her 
physician or health care provider, especially when facing risky alternatives for dealing 
with serious or  life threatening diseases (e.g., Charles, Gafni, & Whelan, 1997; Frosch & 
Kaplan, 1999; Légaré et al., 2008; Towle & Godolphin, 1999).  There is also an extensive 
literature exploring dyads through the study of intimate relationships, much of which is 
relevant to decision making.  For instance, studies often explore how variables such as 
length and perceived quality of relationship influence relationship-related outcomes, 
which presumably are the result of decisions made within the relationship (e.g., Aron, 
Norman, Aron, McKenna & Heyman, 2000; Laurenceau, Barrett, & Pietromonaco, 
1998). Studies of parents as dyads, or “decision units,” have also been examined, 
particularly with respect to decisions about their children (Becker, 1974; Bostrom, 
Hoffmann, Krupnick, Adamowicz, Goldman, McWilliams & Varner, 2005). 
Each of these areas advances our knowledge of dyad decision making within a 
specific set of circumstances (e.g., life-threatening illness) and concerning a particular 
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type of dyad (e.g., father/mother). However, less attention has been given to more generic 
cases, particularly with respect to day-to-day encounters with risky choice.  This is 
somewhat surprising given the quantity of research focused on risky choice by 
individuals. Hundreds of studies designed to test hypotheses derived from expected 
utility-type theories have produced a wealth of data on patterns of risky choice, typically 
in the context of two-outcome gambles (see Mellers, Schwartz, & Cooke, 1998, for a 
review).  In the present study, I enlist this classic risky choice paradigm to compare 
patterns of choice between individuals and dyads. I also move beyond the traditional 
risky choice paradigm by comparing it to a newly introduced paradigm in which 
individuals or dyads actively engage in management of an existing risk.  In what follows, 
I provide a brief overview of studies of individual risky choice, followed by a look at 
related studies among dyads and small groups.  I then introduce some general hypotheses 
derived from theories dealing with motivation and social processes.    
Psychophysical Influences on Risky Choices 
 Hundreds of studies have been done exploring human risky choice behavior (For 
review, see Levin, Schneider, & Gaeth, 1998; Kuhberger, 1998; Mellers, Schwartz, & 
Cooke, 1998). Much of the impetus arose from attempts to test Expected Utility Theory 
and later Prospect Theory. Bernoulli’s (1738, 1954) Expected Utility Theory focused 
attention on probabilities and outcomes in describing risky choices. The theory suggests 
that subjective values (known as utilities) differ from objective values (monetary 
outcomes) in that the utility of gains increases at a slower rate as values move away from 
zero.  When utilities are graphed as a function of objective values, one would expect a 
straight line if the two were equal to one another.  However, the undervaluing of larger 
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amounts results in a concave curve, or one that exhibits decreasing marginal utility. This 
marginally decreasing utility function predicts that a guaranteed win (e.g., 100% 
probability of winning $50) would be preferred over an equal probability of winning $0 
or $100, even though the expected values of the two alternatives are the same. According 
to the function, the difference between receiving $0 and $50 would be experienced as 
larger than the difference between receiving $50 and $100, so that it would not be worth 
giving up the $50 for sure to take a risk on possibly gaining $100.  Hence, the concave 
utility function can explain the commonly observed pattern that people tend to be risk 
averse, avoiding risky alternatives in favor of safer (high probability) ones.    
Essentially, Bernoulli’s explanation of risk averse behavior relied on the 
psychophysics of values.  Because the experienced or subjective magnitudes of options 
systematically differ from the physical magnitudes, risks are routinely experienced as less 
valuable than their mathematical expected values.  Like other psychophysical principles, 
this relationship has been confirmed so often that it has come to be known as the law of 
diminishing marginal utility (e.g., Savage, 1954). 
Over the years, scholars have suggested variations from the original expected 
utility theory. The first variation, which drew immense attention among economists in the 
1940s and 1950s, was introduced by Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944, 1947). This 
version included a canonical mathematical system, via which a rational decision maker 
would be able to assure coherent and consistent risky choices, provided he or she was 
willing to endorse a set of required axioms. Although von Neumann and Morgenstern did 
not make any explicit claims about the inherent value of the axioms, many scholars 
entered the debate about the status of these decision rules (most notably, Savage, 1954).  
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Over time, these axioms were widely embraced as requirements for rationality, bestowing 
the von Neumann and Morgenstern version of expected utility theory with a normative 
status against which actual decision making could be evaluated.  
A second variation to Bernoulli’s original theory was descriptive in nature. 
Savage (1954) introduced the concept of subjective probability in Subjective Expected 
Utility Theory. Savage’s preferred term was ‘personal probability’ (as originally 
introduced by Thornton C. Fry), however, with time, the term ‘subjective probability’ 
gained acceptance among scholars. The basic premise of subjective probability is that, 
like values, subjective assessment of probability does not always match the objective 
probability associated with the outcome in question.  Savage’s characterization does not 
make it clear whether subjective probabilities can best be understood as resulting from 
psychophysical processes or from individual differences in beliefs about likelihood. 
The third variation to expected utility theory came in the form of Prospect Theory 
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1979).  Like the original expected utility theory, prospect theory 
starts with the assumption that risky choice behavior is primarily driven by 
psychophysical processes; in particular, it retains the idea of marginally decreasing 
sensitivity. Instead of utility, Kahneman and Tversky introduce a subjective value 
function.  For gains, the function is concave like the standard utility function.  However, 
Kahneman and Tversky also explicitly include losses in their subjective value function.   
Oddly enough, by maintaining marginally decreasing sensitivity in the negative domain, 
the function becomes convex, leading to the somewhat surprising prediction of a 
tendency to be risk seeking (preferring the gamble over the sure thing) for losses. 
Considering a risk of losing $50 for sure versus a 50% risk of losing $0 or $100, the 
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difference between losing $0 and $50 would be experienced as larger (i.e., worse) than 
the difference between losing $50 and $100, so that it would not be worth taking a loss of 
$50 for sure to avoid a possibly larger loss of $100 (marginally decreasing sensitivity still 
at work). This is likely to lead one to go for the risky alternative. 
Together, this gives the prospect theory value function curve an S-like shape, 
which is concave in the positive domain and convex in the negative domain.  The 
introduction of a specified origin in the value function is also significant. Kahneman and 
Tversky suggest that perceptual processes are highly sensitive to changes and that the 
subjective value function serves as a measure of change from some default asset position.  
The origin represents this default position and serves as the reference point for choice.  
This reference point is subject to change with each new decision, usually as a function of 
changes in one’s status quo. Tversky and Kahneman (1991) call this reference 
dependence, which implies that the perception of gains and losses is tied to the reference 
point adopted for the decision.  They hypothesize that minor to moderate changes in 
reference point are not likely to substantially influence preferences.  
Although Bernoulli briefly touched upon the issue of losses (Bernoulli, 1954, pp. 
26-27), it was the prospect theory value function that clearly showed how choice 
tendencies are likely to reflect a risk seeking attitude when dealing with perceived losses. 
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) also argue that perceived losses are experienced more 
strongly than perceived gains, which is visible in a steeper curve in the negative domain 
of the value function. They call this loss aversion, and argue that, all else equal, “losses 
loom larger than gains” (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979, pp. 279). For example, people are 
reluctant to take an even bet that would result in either winning or losing some amount, 
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say, $5. Most people would find this bet unattractive, because the perceived impact of the 
negative consequence (losing $5) would seem stronger than the potential impact of the 
equivalent positive consequence (winning $5). 
Prospect theory also introduces the idea of decision weights. The decision weight 
function retains the basic idea of subjective probability. Kahneman and Tversky (1979) 
go beyond Savage’s characterization by describing decision weights not as simple 
degrees of belief but as measures of a somewhat more complex construct of “the impact 
of events on the desirability of prospects” (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979, pp. 280). They 
argue that probabilities are subject to a decision weighting function, and the values of 
possible outcomes are multiplied by these decision weights. Kahneman and Tversky 
(1979) theorize that large probabilities tend to be underweighted and small probabilities 
tend to be overweighted. So people will tend to feel less sure of highly likely outcomes 
than is warranted and more sure of unlikely outcomes. 
Prospect theory also incorporates a cognitive element with the introduction of an 
“editing phase” in the decision making process. Kahneman and Tversky propose that 
people usually engage in a “preliminary analysis” to simplify outcomes and probabilities, 
prior to entering the evaluation phase. Although Kahneman and Tversky (1979) provide 
some examples of how editing might occur, there is little systematic agreement about 
these processes.  Many studies use simple (“post-editing”) stimuli in order to test the 
primary predictions of prospect theory and rule out editing processes as a possible 
alternative explanation of results.  
The next section provides a brief review of some of the findings on risky choice. 
The focus is on the prospect theory prediction that is most often put to the test (See, e.g., 
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Hershey & Schoemaker, 1980; Kuhberger, 1998; Levin, Schneider, & Gaeth, 1998; 
Weber, 1999). The prediction involves a preference reversal pattern in which preferences 
are risk averse for gains but are risk seeking for losses. 
Soon after the original prospect theory was published, Hershey and Schoemaker 
(1980) critically evaluated the generalizability of the preference reversal prediction by 
studying decision making under risk both between and within subjects. They presented 
participants with a series of choices between a sure gain/loss and a probabilistic gain/loss, 
with matched expected values. Hershey and Schoemaker found little support for 
Kahneman and Tversky’s predictions of risk averse for gains and risk seeking for losses, 
when making comparisons across subjects. When they did find a reversal (7-25% of 
choices), it typically involved a sure thing with a high value or a gamble with high 
variance. Given this weak support for Prospect Theory predictions regarding preference 
reversals, perceptual influences on choice behavior may not be sufficient to describe 
and/or explain risky choice behavior. 
Kuhberger (1998) also completed a review of Prospect Theory’s preference 
reversal prediction, but his focus was on framing effects and monetary gambles. Framing 
effects occur when descriptions of the same set of alternatives in terms of gains versus 
losses produce preference reversals. A typical example of a framing manipulation in 
decision making research is the Asian Disease problem. This problem involves choice 
options framed either in terms of possible lives saved (positive frame) or in terms of 
possible lives lost (negative frame). In his review, Kuhberger found a low to moderate 
impact of framing across studies, resulting in preference differences from positive to 
negative domains. Kuhberger (1998) also reports preference reversals to be more 
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common in the typical case of riskless choice (choices with certain outcomes or sure 
things) and risky choice (probability of outcomes vary), in comparison to risky-risky 
choice cases. Thus, while partial support of preference reversals was observed, the 
question remains how generalizable these patterns are. 
Levin, Schneider and Gaeth (1998) conducted a more refined review of framing 
effect studies.  After removing examples of framing that did not necessarily involve risky 
choice, they were able to isolate cases in which risk preferences changed for positively 
versus negatively framed outcomes. The majority of studies showed some effect of 
framing, though few were clear preference reversals as Prospect Theory would predict. In 
most cases, preferences appeared to differ across valence, but not by much. Clear 
preference reversals were generally found only for studies in which the task domain was 
similar to the Asian Disease Problem used by Tversky and Kahneman (1981) to introduce 
framing effects. Several studies did not find significant differences in preferences for gain 
and loss frames across different scenarios. This again points out the limited 
generalizability of Prospect Theory predictions regarding preference reversals from risky 
gains to losses. 
Another vein of research focused on different definitions of risk, and showed how 
different interpretations of risk could influence preferences. Weber (1999) distinguishes 
perceived risk attitudes from traditional economic definitions of risk as variance.  For 
economists, risk aversion is associated with low variance outcomes and risk seeking with 
high variance outcomes. Perceived risk attitude emphasizes the individual’s perception of 
some alternative as more or less risky. Weber and colleagues found that the average 
individual’s perception of risk may not be exclusively dependent on variance. The same 
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alternative (for example, the low variance outcome alternative) could be perceived by the 
decision maker as less risky in one domain and more risky in the other.  
Using gamble pairs, Mellers, Schwartz, and Weber (1997) found economically-
defined risk attitudes to be reversed from gain to loss domains for the majority of subjects 
(61%), which is consistent with Prospect Theory predictions (though somewhat weak). 
However, they observed that perceived risk attitudes did not change in the same way.  
Most participants (60%) were consistent across domains in their perceived risk attitude, 
with 44% of all participants reporting that they were risk averters. This points out that 
traditionally defined concepts of risk may not always fit with what people experience as 
risk.  These findings also raise a question about Prospect Theory’s ability to explain risky 
choice in terms of perceptual or psychophysical processes. Logically, the Prospect 
Theory implications regarding willingness to take risks and the perceived risk attitudes 
studied by Weber and colleagues should match up. However, participants’ responses 
indicated that their (and perhaps the lay person’s) interpretation of risk does not 
necessarily equal the economic definition of risk assumed in Prospect Theory. This casts 
some doubt on the classification of Prospect Theory as a perceptual theory of risky 
choice. 
Weber and Milliman (1997) studied perceived risk attitude and risk preference in 
paradigms of commuter train times and financial investments (with hypothetically 
endowed amounts). They also found that participants tended to be consistent in their risk 
preferences based on their assessment of perceived riskiness of alternatives. Over 75% of 
the participants exhibited consistent perceived-risk attitudes across gain and loss 
domains, and more than 65% consistently chose the less risky alternative across domains 
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in both the commuter train times and financial investments studies. They observed risk 
seeking preferences in the gain domain, when participants expressed their preferences for 
commuter train times. Thus, results were not consistent with preference reversal 
predictions of Prospect Theory. Additionally, here too, the concept of perceived risk 
attitude, as reported by participants, did not match with the standard economic 
interpretation of risk as variance.  
Weber and colleagues’ work provides weak support for the kinds of preference 
reversals predicted by Prospect Theory, especially in cases involving sure things and high 
risk situations. At the same time, their work also highlights problems with the basis for 
Prospect Theory predictions. Prospect Theory may not adequately capture people’s 
experience of riskiness, thus the perceptual underpinnings of the theory may be in 
question. 
In summary, there is mixed support for Prospect Theory preference reversal 
predictions. The prediction is most likely to hold for choices involving a risky option 
compared to a sure thing. The lack of generalizability points out that there may be 
additional influencing factors on risky choice than those proposed in Prospect Theory. 
Most people tend to have a strong reaction when they are exposed to risk, which may be 
reflected in their perceived attitude toward risk. As we have seen, this experience is not 
reflected in the economic view of risk.  One aspect of perceived risk that is ignored in 
both economic theory and Prospect Theory views of risky choice is an affective or 
motivational component which intuitively is an integral part of risky situations. People 
routinely describe the experience of hope and fear associated with taking risks.  In 
addition, pre-existing orientations, or personality characteristics, may also play a role in 
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determining how people react to risk in general. Therefore, looking into dispositional and 
motivational factors may give us another perspective on people’s dealings with risk. The 
next section reviews briefly approaches exploring this possibility.  
Motivational and Dispositional Influences on Risky Choices 
Another approach to risky decision making explains the process as arising from 
dispositional and motivational sources, rather than psychophysical ones. Lopes 
introduced the SP/A (Security Potential/Aspiration) theory, which brings in affective 
influences that are more in line with traditional approach-avoidance paradigms (Lopes, 
1984, 1987; Schneider & Lopes, 1986). Lopes does not deny the relevance of the 
marginally decreasing utility function. She rather draws attention to the differences in the 
theoretical approaches to describing decision behavior. Lopes (1984, 1987) suggests that 
there are two dispositional inclinations towards risk that differ according to appetitive 
versus avoidant reactions to risk.  Those with a security focus are dispositionally inclined 
to avoid the negative consequences associated with risk taking and those with a potential 
focus are dispositionally inclined toward approaching the positive consequences 
associated with risk taking.  Lopes suggests that most people are security oriented, and 
are thus typically risk averse in their behavior. 
SP/A theory also suggests that situational factors introduce another approach-
avoidance variable, in particular, with respect to aspiration levels.  High aspiration levels 
typically require that some risk must be tolerated in order to reach a goal, whereas lower 
aspiration levels may be reached without having to take risks.  SP/A theory implies that 
risk preferences will be strong when dispositional tendencies match situational needs, but 
  12 
 
will be weaker and more conflicted when dispositional tendencies are at odds with 
situational needs. 
According to Lopes, most people are likely to exhibit risk averse decision patterns 
most of the time, because most people are hypothesized to have security-prone 
dispositions. There are two occasions, however, when even security-minded people may 
engage in risk-seeking behavior. First, when they feel safe (i.e., when no element of 
threat to their sense of security exists), they may feel comfortable taking risk. So, for 
instance, security-minded people might be willing to take a risk when all outcomes 
involve something positive.  The second occasion is on the other extreme, when security-
minded people are under great threat.  In such threatening situations, no safe alternative is 
available, and any hope of getting out of the situation may require taking a risk.  In these 
cases, the disposition to “play it safe” is in conflict with the aspiration to avoid 
acceptance of a bad outcome. 
Instead of using two-outcome gambles, Schneider and Lopes (1986) used a more 
complex set of multi-outcome lotteries to study decision preferences of individuals who 
were pre-screened as dispositionally risk averse or risk seeking. They found 70% of their 
prescreened participants to be dispositionally risk averse (risk averse participants). 
Schneider and Lopes (1986) observed complex patterns of risk preferences, which 
emphasized that, factors other than perception must also be at work. They found weak 
support for reversal of preferences from risk averse to risk seeking in gain to loss 
domains predicted by Kahneman and Tversky (1979). With the exception of lotteries 
with a better-than-zero (risk less lottery) worst outcome, the typical risk averse 
participant was strongly risk averse for gains.  Hence, the sure thing was strongly 
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preferred in most cases.  Lotteries that guaranteed more than zero were also quite 
popular, and sometimes preferred to the sure thing. Lotteries with minimum outcomes 
greater than zero pose no threat to the sense of security, since there is nothing to lose with 
these gambles. This may have allowed the participants to raise their aspiration level 
higher than the sure thing. The riskless lotteries offer the opportunity for winning an 
amount higher than the sure amount, possibly closer to the raised aspiration level.  
However, in the loss domain, the possibility of losing at least some amount posed 
a serious threat to the participant’s sense of safety. Therefore, for loss lotteries, the 
typically risk averse participant exhibited a mixed pattern of preferences. For losses, 
participants appeared to dislike the lotteries at both extremes; the safest (including sure 
thing) probably because it does not meet their aspiration levels, and the riskiest, probably 
because the threat to security is too high, and they wanted to minimize the chance of the 
worst loss. 
Higgins’ Self Discrepancy Theory (1987) and later the Regulatory Focus 
Theory/Principle (1997) also share a focus on motivational and dispositional factors 
influencing human experience and behavior. Higgins’ early work centered on explaining 
personality differences in terms of dispositional tendencies to focus on discrepancies in 
self-concept relative to an “ideal” self or relative to an “ought” self.  Higgins found that 
those who focus on self-concept discrepancies with the “ideal” self are more apt to 
regularly experience emotions such as joy and dejection, whereas those who focus on 
discrepancies with the “ought” self are more likely to experience feelings of relief and 
anxiety.  These findings eventually led to Higgins’ concept of regulatory focus, which 
highlights motivational influences in personality.  In particular, Higgins hypothesizes that 
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some people tend to focus on promoting the positive, whereas others prioritize preventing 
the negative (Higgins, 1998; Shah & Higgins, 1997). Higgins connects an individual’s 
ideal self discrepancy concerns with promotion focused strategic inclinations, where one 
seeks matches with positive outcomes, such as hopes and aspirations. Higgins connects 
the individual’s ought self discrepancy concerns with prevention focused strategic 
inclinations, where one seeks prevention of mismatches with negative outcomes often 
associated with duties and obligations, (Higgins, 1996; Higgins, Roney, Crowe, & 
Hymes, 1994). The prevention-promotion distinction in regulatory focus is conceptually 
similar to Lopes’s security-potential dichotomy. Both emphasize the importance of 
approach-avoidance motivation as a guide in behavior. 
Crowe and Higgins (1997) studied the impact of regulatory focus on strategic 
inclinations in decision making, using a signal detection paradigm. Crowe and Higgins 
(1997) associated a risky response bias with promotion-focused individuals and a 
conservative response bias with prevention-focused individuals. They found that 
promotion-focused individuals were more likely to take risks (be more prone to getting 
‘hits’ and ‘false alarms’), and prevention-focused individuals were more likely to play it 
safe, and generally be risk averse (be more prone to avoiding ‘misses’ and getting 
‘correct rejections’). This finding may be mapped on to Lopes (and colleagues’) work 
connecting potential-oriented persons with risk seeking and security-oriented people with 
risk aversion (Lopes, 1984, 1987; Schneider & Lopes, 1986). 
Weber and Milliman (1997) also drew the connection between dispositional and 
situational factors in their explanation for risk preferences and perceived risk attitudes. In 
choices between possible commuter train times, they observed risk seeking (i.e., higher 
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variance) preferences for 61% of the participants in the gain domain. This does not match 
what would be predicted by the Prospect Theory value function.  Weber and Milliman 
(1997) cite aspiration level as the possible influencing factor behind people’s preferences 
for the higher variance train times in the gain domain. When all options were faster than 
average, people could rely on some savings either way, so that none of the options would 
have a downside or—in SP/A terms—be a threat to security or the status quo.  Thus, 
aspiration levels could be raised without any worry, so that the possibility of saving the 
maximum time could now be considered the more attractive alternative.  Risk perceptions 
were also apparently sensitive to this lack of a downside. Greater unpredictability, when 
there was no downside, was associated with the possibility of the greatest savings, and so 
was seen by some (34%) as less risky.   
In the loss domain, where trains were running slower than current average 
commute time, however, concern for avoiding the maximum time loss frequently led 
participants to make risk averse choices in traditional terms. In this case, greater 
unpredictability had a downside, or an element of threat (e.g., being late for work or 
class), which was seen by the overwhelming majority as more dangerous or risky.  Weber 
and Milliman (1997), therefore, emphasized that what people considered as “risky” 
changed from one domain to the other. These observations also point out that real life 
contingencies may be a determining factor behind assessments of riskiness.   
Dispositional and motivational theories have thus informed researchers of the 
possibility of pre-existing tendencies and situational characteristics together influencing 
people’s behavior. They remind us that people’s initial (gut-level) reaction towards risk 
  16 
 
may set the tone for the decision making process; but the complete process may involve 
impact of situational demands as well. 
From a review of the existing literature on risky decision making, Prospect 
Theory has done fairly well in describing standard risky choice behavior, particularly 
when sure things or extreme outcomes have been involved. Nevertheless, it is not clear 
that Prospect Theory’s reliance on psychophysics gets to the heart of the experience of 
risk, and thus, may be inadequate or incomplete as a theory of risky choice.  Motivational 
and dispositional explanations, including the SP/A Theory, potentially may expand the 
ability to understand risky choice across a larger variety of risky decision situations. 
With the objective of exploring these different influences on risky decision 
making, the present study includes two different tasks.  I hypothesize that the simpler 
psychophysical explanation is more likely to be plausible in situations that are more 
superficial and less actively engaging.  In contrast, motivational and dispositional 
influences are more likely to be seen when the decision situation demands a more active 
level of engagement on the part of the decision maker.  The first task is the standard 
passive risky choice task, which is a paradigm expected to favor the perceptual 
perspective. The second task is a novel active managing risk task (Schneider, Hudspeth & 
Decker, manuscript in preparation), which may be more likely to engage dispositional 
and motivational processes.  
Additionally, the author explores decision making in dyads, which provides the 
opportunity to examine whether the introduction of another person into the decision 
making environment may bring in yet another set of factors: social influences. Findings 
related to possible social influences on risky choice will be discussed next. 
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Social Influences on Decision Making in Groups and Dyads 
While group phenomena have been studied extensively in various sub-areas of 
psychology throughout the last century, studies of decision making under conditions of 
risk comparing groups and individuals became popular starting in the early sixties. Hunt 
and Rowe (1960), Stoner (1961) and Wallach, Kogan and Bem (1962) are a few names 
among researchers who studied risky decision making in individuals and groups in the 
early sixties. 
Wallach et al., (1962) found groups to be more inclined to prefer risky 
alternatives over cautious ones following group discussions, as compared to individuals 
in the absence of discussion. In Wallach et al.’s, (1962) study, group members were 
previously unacquainted and had the same status (no identifiable influential 
characteristics) when group members began interacting. Participants considered several 
scenarios, and in each they provided their recommendation regarding the lowest 
probability of success that the character in the scenario should require before selecting 
the riskier of two options.  In questions afterward, some individual members of the group 
reported that individuals who were more risky tended to be more influential in the group 
than those who were more cautious.  
Wallach et al., (1962) offer two possible explanations for the observed risky shift 
phenomenon. First, Wallach et al., (1962) consider ‘diffusion of responsibility’ among 
group members as a possible reason for the shift towards riskier decisions following 
group discussion. Diffusion of responsibility occurs when being part of a larger group 
reduces individual member’s sense of personal accountability or responsibility for the 
outcomes of decisions. Wallach, Kogan and Bem (1964) speculate that this phenomenon 
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may be related to decreased anxiety from emotional bonds created in the group setting, 
where risk is perceived as shared. Second, Wallach et al., (1962) consider the possibility 
that risk takers tend to be more influential in groups and that this could play a role in the 
observed shift towards riskier decisions following group discussion. They propose that 
these individuals might be more inclined to take initiative in mediating the group 
discussion. Such initiative could lead to greater acceptance of risk in the decision making, 
compared to average pre-discussion individual preferences. 
With respect to the present thesis, the question is whether we shall observe similar 
decision patterns in dyads. Previous work suggests that the presence of many people in a 
group provides the possibility that a given individual’s sense of accountability may be 
diminished. However, when only two people are present, as in a dyad, both are at least 
partly responsible for the decision outcomes. Therefore, for dyads, it is questionable 
whether diffusion of responsibility would occur. Also, with two people, the hypothesis 
that risk takers might be more influential seems less likely given that both people are 
required to interact to make the decision. 
Using a similar design as the one used by Wallach et al., (1962), Stoner (1961) 
compared risky decisions in groups and individuals. He observed a risky shift in majority 
of his participants. However, not all group members were consistently more risky across 
all items following discussion. Nordhøy (1962) revisited Stoner (1961) and Wallach et 
al.’s (1962) work.  He observed that, for at least some of their choice items, several group 
members exhibited a cautious shift following group discussion.  
Stoner (1961, 1968) explains this with reference to the general value hypotheses 
of Nordhøy (1962) and Brown (1965). According to this hypothesis, group decision shifts 
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would be to riskier or safer (more cautious) alternatives depending on how they match 
with widely held values within the culture, which will be reflected in the individual’s 
original inclinations. For example, if decisions concern a choice such as marriage, the 
culturally approved value may rest on the side of caution rather than risk; in such cases, 
group discussion is likely to lead to more cautious decisions, compared to individuals 
making decisions by themselves. 
The risky and cautious shift observations were later described as variations of a 
single phenomenon called group (attitude) polarization (Moscovici & Zavalloni, 1969). A 
wide range of theoretical and research work has been carried out in the area of group 
polarization, from the pioneering work of Moscovici and Zavalloni (1969), to Myers and 
Lamm (1976) to more recent work by Stasser and Titus (2006), and Luhan, Kocher and 
Sutter (2009). Group polarization occurs when discussion among the group members 
creates the sense of a single decision making unit, working towards a shared goal. This 
often causes individual preferences to align with that of the group majority. Inclination of 
the majority of the individual members in a group is strengthened when the group 
behaves as a decision making unit. Research with groups has shown that groups make 
significantly “more extreme” choices than individuals (For review, see Isenberg, 1986; 
Myers & Lamm, 1976). Notably, decisions tend to be made in the same directions as 
majority of the individuals. 
Research has shown that individuals who made moderately risky decisions prior 
to group interaction made even riskier choices following group discussion, whereas 
individuals who made initially cautious preferences showed a heightened tendency to 
choose safer alternatives following group discussion (e.g., Deets & Hoyt, 1970; 
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McCauley, Stitt, Woods & Lipton, 1974; Zaleska, 1974, 1976). Thus, the polarization 
effect produces the same pattern of pre-discussion preferences, only more pronounced.  
Notice that the risky or cautious shift is sometimes consistent with polarization processes, 
but not always.  If group discussion shifts decisions in a direction opposite to the one 
originally favored by many individuals (e.g., risky shift in which risk averse individuals 
gravitate to more risky choices after discussion), this would be inconsistent with a 
polarization explanation. 
For the present thesis, the relevant question is concerned with how dyads’ 
decision preferences may be affected by group—or in this case, partner-discussion. If 
polarization takes place in dyads, dyad members will make more extreme decisions 
together compared to individuals. So, if individuals are typically risk averse, dyads would 
be expected to be even more risk averse.  If individuals are risk seeking, dyads will be 
even more so.  If risky or cautious shifts occur, dyads will tend to take more of less risks, 
respectively, than individuals, independent of individual predispositions.   
There are few studies that allow a comparison of risky/cautious shift versus group 
polarization hypotheses in the context of dyads.  In one of the rare exceptions, Keller, 
Sarin and Sounderpandian (2002, 2007) compared individual and dyad preferences for 
monetary gambles involving risk (i.e., stated probabilities) or uncertainty (i.e., unknown 
probabilities).  In all conditions, they found that cautious shifts predominated. Both 
individual and dyad tended to be risk averse. Most dyads (typically around 60%) became 
more risk averse (i.e., cautious) than individuals when facing risky and ambiguous 
monetary choice situations. However, there was also a sizable minority that became less 
risk averse (i.e., risky shift, typically around 25-30%).  Although the majority results are 
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consistent with a group polarization explanation, the subset of dyads that moved in a 
riskier direction suggest that other social influences were also present. 
In a more recent study, Hardisty and Sanitioso (2007) studied three-person groups 
using various communication media to make hypothetical decisions about taking business 
risks. Hardisty and Sanitioso found that face-to-face discussion as well as video 
conferencing led to more extreme group decisions compared to individual ones. The 
pattern of results was consistent with Prospect Theory predictions of risk aversion for 
gains and risk seeking for losses, though more extreme for groups than individuals. 
However, they did not find this effect of polarization for instant messaging (IM). For the 
IM condition, participants showed an opposite effect, expressing risk aversion for losses, 
and moving toward risk seeking for gains (though in both conditions, they were generally 
in favor of the sure option).  Again, there is partial support for the role of group 
polarization but only for two of the three media. 
Work on peer influences may also provide some insight into social influences in 
dyad decision making.  Gardner and Steinberg (2005) studied the impact of peer 
influence on risk preference, risk taking, and risky decision making by comparing 
individuals and three person groups in adolescents (13-16 year olds), youths (18-22 year 
olds), and adults (24 years and older).   The authors tested risk-taking using a video game 
about driving called ‘Chicken.’  In the video game, participants were required to make 
decisions about stopping or continuing to drive after a traffic light turns yellow.  While 
continuing could earn more points for the participant, crashing if the light turned red 
before the car stopped would lead to losing all points.  Gardner and Steinberg found in all 
three age groups that individuals engaged in more risk taking when in presence of two 
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other same-age individuals volunteering advice than when alone.  They observed the 
overall impact of peer influence (enhancing risky inclinations) to be most prominent in 
adolescents and young adults compared to older adults. The individuals in peer groups 
thus exhibited a risky shift, especially among adolescents. Because our dyad participants 
are mostly in the youth (young adult) age range, we are likely to observe some effect of 
peer influence on risk preferences. Although it was not possible in Gardner and 
Steinberg’s study to assess whether the shift in preferences was consistent with 
polarization of risk attitudes, the present work will provide the opportunity to observe 
whether polarization versus risky shift patterns occur in dyads. 
In addition to peer influences, the literature on persuasion may also provide 
insight into social influences in decision making. Wood’s (2000) review of the persuasion 
and social influences in social interactions revealed that motivations about the self, the 
other and the situation may all bring about changes in attitude. One way that social 
influence may occur is through learning new arguments in favor or against an alternative.  
According to the classic Persuasive Arguments Theory (Burnstein & Vinokur, 1977; 
Vinokur & Burnstein, 1974, 1978; Vinokur, Trope & Burnstein, 1975), for instance, each 
member of a group is only aware of a few of the existing arguments in favor of a choice. 
Group interaction offers the opportunity for exposure to a greater number of arguments 
compared to deciding alone. If discussion leads to a greater number of arguments 
favoring riskier over safer alternatives, the Persuasive Arguments Theory would suggest 
a riskier choice, and vice versa (Vinokur, Trope & Burnstein, 1975). In the context of the 
present study, dyads may potentially come up with more arguments in favor of the riskier 
(or safer) alternatives and therefore make decisions towards (or away from) risk 
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depending on cognitive availability of arguments. According to SP/A theory, since most 
people are likely to be more concerned with security, they may also be more likely to 
think up arguments in support of caution rather than risk, leading to an increase in risk 
averse decisions. 
Finally, one of the other factors that could be a possible social influence on the 
dyad decision process is norms. According to Fehr and Fischbacher (2004), from food 
sharing to mating practices to religious traditions, and cooperative as well as defense 
activities, social norms have a large role in influencing human behavior. Clark (1984), 
Elster (1989), Fiske (1992) and Heyman and Ariely (2004) observed the application of 
different sets of norms by people when dealing with different sets of scenarios. Out of 
these, two major categories have been noted: social and economic (market) norms. 
Compared to the economic market, which usually involves a clear exchange of equivalent 
benefits (e.g., a person expects to pay a certain amount of money to receive a good of a 
given value), the social context is more complex. The social context involves different 
types of interactions, and different types of norm relations (e.g., a person may not expect 
to pay for a good given to them by a parent). Additionally, there are varying 
circumstances, in which the same relations can take on different considerations (e.g., a 
friend becomes one’s work supervisor), requiring reassessment of norms to be applied. 
Therefore, in social interactions, the norms may be harder to determine and apply a 
priori. Kerr, Garst, Lewandowski and Harris (1997) studied the influence of human 
tendency to behave according to established group norms compared to inclination to act 
following internalized personal norms. They found that personal convictions were not the 
only predictor of how people behaved, but that group norms, which were defined and 
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established via group discussion, also contributed to behavior. In working with dyads, we 
might also expect that social norms may become a part of the decision process.  Because 
the dyads will be working cooperatively toward a common outcome, we expect that 
social norms would be likely to enhance collaborative efforts.   
In the context of the present research, we imagine that dyad partners will be 
motivated both to persuade their task partner towards their own way of thinking, but also 
to work cooperatively toward a common goal. If security is a more common motivation 
as predicted by SP/A Theory, the dyads may be able to accomplish both goals by tending 
toward risk averse choices. The next section describes in details the general and specific 
hypotheses.   
Hypotheses and Predictions 
The thesis presents the opportunity to explore whether individuals and dyads 
respond similarly when dealing with risk in different situations. For each research 
question, competing hypotheses supported by each relevant theoretical perspective are 
delineated.  
Research question 1. Does risky decision making differ across situational 
contexts? 
Competing hypothesis 1. If Prospect Theory value function predictions hold 
across multiple situations, then for both risky choice and risk management tasks, 
participants would exhibit a risk averse pattern of preferences for gains and a risk seeking 
pattern for losses.  
Competing hypothesis 2. If SP/A theory predictions hold across multiple 
situations, then for both risky choice and risk management tasks, participants would 
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exhibit a general risk averse pattern of preferences. Some risk taking may be observed, 
particularly for choices involving assured gains, and posing no threat to security. 
Competing hypothesis 3.  If risky decision making differs due to the nature of the 
situation, then the two theories may apply differentially based on the psychological 
processes most likely to be activated.  The Risky Choice task seems more passive, static, 
and reactive whereas Risk Management was designed to be more active, dynamic, and 
situated. Therefore prospect theory may be better able to predict risky choice preferences 
whereas SP/A theory may be better able to predict risk management preferences. 
Prospect Theory is a theory of choice (with the characteristics listed above); so 
Prospect Theory should do a good job of predicting results for the choice task, risk 
seeking for losses and risk averse for gains.  Since stimuli are in effect equivalent across 
tasks, Prospect Theory should do just as well at predicting the management task unless 
the process of actively changing one’s current situation is fundamentally different from 
passively responding to given alternatives.  Active decision making may engage 
motivational processes more, which could change the pattern of decision making. 
SP/A theory is a theory about how dispositions and situational motivations affect 
risk preferences. Ideally, the theory should be applicable to both choice and risk 
management tasks. However, the decision making literature shows risky choice behavior 
to be fairly consistent with prospect theory predictions, but these are all for standard 
(passive) risky choice situations, and usually situations involving a sure thing versus a 
two-outcome risk where one outcome is zero. SP/A may do better for other gain and loss 
lotteries (ones that may not involve a sure thing or zero outcome).   
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Risk management, by definition, is a more active, dynamic undertaking that is 
likely to initiate motivational processes that are more typical of daily-life decision 
making. In particular, because management involves dealing with a situation over time, it 
might better reflect the combination of dispositional, motivational, and situational 
influences hypothesized in SP/A theory.  Tendencies toward ensuring security or seeking 
potential might be exaggerated due to the active manipulation of worse and better 
outcomes in risk management.  Aspiration levels might be more salient in the 
management task than the choice task because participants may set a level as part of their 
management strategy.  Thus, overall, SP/A theory predictions may be more predictive in 
active risk management tasks compared to passive risky choice tasks. 
Schneider and colleagues (Schneider, Hudspeth and Decker, manuscript in 
preparation) showed that, in individuals, tasks focused on newly introduced risk (as in 
standard risky choice) yielded remarkably different patterns from an analogous situation 
that was presented as a problem of managing existing risk. In the first (risky choice) 
study, they found a weak pattern of results roughly consistent with prospect theory with 
risk seeking in negative and risk aversion in the positive domain. However, in the risk 
management study, they observed a distinctly risk averse approach on behalf of the 
individuals when approaching risk overall. In a sense, in the risk management study, the 
individual (or the dyad in the present study) is endowed with this (existing) risk and has 
to manage it. This active aspect of risk management is likely to be influenced by 
motivational factors, more so perhaps than the passive risky choice task. In the present 
work, the opportunity was available to extend these findings to decision making in dyads.  
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Research question 2. How might risk taking differ from individuals to 
dyads? 
The social psychological literature offers at least two relevant perspectives 
regarding influences of social factors on risky decision making. According to the 
risky/cautious shift perspective, groups (in the present work, dyads) would engage in 
greater/lesser risk taking following group discussion. This shift would be irrespective of 
the original attitude of majority of the individual participants. According to the group 
polarization perspective, on the other hand, dyads would make more extreme decisions in 
the same direction as the majority of individuals. Because both SP/A and Prospect  
Theory posit different risk preference patterns as a function of outcome valence, the 
prediction for group polarization assumes that individuals’ attitudes toward risk may vary 
for gains and losses. Therefore, preferences of individuals at various outcome levels were 
used as the indicator of majority individual attitudes for gains versus losses. 
Competing hypothesis 1. According to the risky shift literature of group decision 
making, groups tend to take more risks than individuals. In contrast, the cautious 
hypothesis suggests that groups avoid risk more than individuals.   
If risky or cautious shift and Prospect Theory (PT) were both to be correct in 
predicting individuals’ and dyads’ risk preferences, results would show a pattern 
illustrated in Figure 1. So, for PT and risky shift predictions to be correct, dyads would 
tend in all cases to make riskier decisions compared to individuals as shown in the dotted 
line above the individual data. On the other hand, if PT and cautious shift predictions 
were correct, dyads would consistently make safer choices than individuals as indicated 
by the more risk averse preferences in the dotted line below the individual data.      
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Figure 1. Predictions for Risk Preferences according to Prospect Theory  
and Risky and Cautious Shift Perspectives 
 
Competing hypothesis 2.  Assuming that individual majority preferences are 
indicative of typical risk attitudes, the group polarization hypothesis would suggest that 
dyad discussion would strengthen those initial attitudes and exaggerate patterns of risk 
behavior. However, this shift could be either in the direction of risk or caution, depending 
on dyad partners’ original predispositions. If Prospect Theory and group polarization 
perspectives were both correctly predicting risk preferences, decision behavior patterns 
would be likely to resemble the dotted preference curve in Figure 2. 
Overall, dyads would continue the same pattern of preferences of risk seeking for 
losses and risk aversion for gains, as predicted for individuals in PT. If group polarization 
took place, the only notable change would be an emphasized pattern for the dyads in each 
domain. Therefore, dyads would tend to be more risk seeking for losses and more risk 
averse for gains compared to individuals. 
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Figure 2. Predictions for Risk Preferences according to Prospect Theory  
and Group Polarization Perspectives 
 
Competing hypothesis 3. If risky or cautious shift and SP/A Theory were both to 
be correct in predicting individuals’ and dyads’ risk preferences, results would show a 
pattern illustrated in Figure 3. For SP/A and risky shift predictions to be correct, dyads 
would make riskier decisions compared to individuals as shown in the dotted line above 
the individual data. On the other hand, if SP/A and cautious shift predictions were 
correct, dyads would consistently make more risk averse choices than individuals as 
indicated by the dotted line below the individual data.  If group polarization were coupled 
with SP/A theory predictions, dyad preferences would resemble the same pattern as for 
cautious shift because majority preferences under SP/A theory are expected to be 
predominantly risk averse across most if not all outcome values. 
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Figure 3. Predictions for Risk Preferences according to SP/A Theory  
and Risky versus Cautious Shift and Group Polarization Perspectives 
 
Few studies have explored group versus individual preferences across outcome 
valences.  One exception, Marquis and Reitz (1969) observed that groups would take 
more risks than individuals for positive expected values, but were less likely to take risks 
for negative expected values, with no discernable change for zero expected value. This 
was consistent with the original individual preference patterns suggesting that group 
polarization processes provided a better explanation than either a general risky shift or a 
cautious shift. These results also provide support for the idea that social influences may 
affect risk taking differently as a function of outcome valence (and in this case were 
generally supportive of the pattern anticipated in SP/A theory rather than PT). 
Research question 3: How might risk taking differ for valence (negative, 
mixed, and positive lotteries)? 
Competing hypothesis 1.  According to Prospect Theory, for positive lotteries 
which would result in gains, risk averse preferences are expected. For negative lotteries 
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representing losses, a general inclination towards risk taking would be observed.  For 
mixed lotteries (wherein outcomes include losses, gains, and/or zero), preference patterns 
are likely to be exaggerated because the value function implies that sensitivity to 
changing values should be greatest for values closest to zero.  For negative expected 
values, an intensified risk seeking pattern of preferences would be expected, and for 
positive expected values, a stronger risk averse pattern would be expected.  
Competing hypothesis 2. According to SP/A theory, an overall risk averse pattern 
is predicted. Loss lotteries present a more tangible threat to people’s sense of security, 
supporting risk aversion. For gain lotteries, no tangible threat to security is present. 
Therefore, if aspiration level is set (moderately) high, the individual may engage in some 
risk taking. For mixed lotteries, concern for security would push decision makers away 
from outcomes with losses. For lotteries with negative expected values, this would 
typically lead to risk aversion in order to avoid the worst possible loss, but occasionally 
might support risk seeking if the riskier option is the only one that involves the chance to 
lose nothing. For lotteries with positive expected values, security-seeking would lead to 
strong risk aversion when the riskier option involves a possible loss, and weaker risk 
aversion when the riskier option’s worst outcome is zero.   
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Method 
This thesis brings together findings from four different studies, comparing risky 
decision making in dyads and individuals in two different tasks. One task is the standard 
passive risky choice task, which requires participants to react to pre-determined risky 
alternatives. The other is a novel managing risk task, which requires participants to 
actively modify a risk that they are currently facing. Only data for dyads were collected 
as part of the thesis. Data for individuals were collected by Schneider, Hudspeth and 
Decker (manuscript in preparation) earlier. Each set of data was collected in a different 
semester, from virtually the same participant pool of undergraduate students enrolled in 
Psychology courses, with a high consistency of demographic characteristics across 
semesters.  
Participants 
Data were collected following university IRB requirements from students enrolled 
in undergraduate Psychology courses for course credit.  After an introduction to the 
lotteries, a quiz was administered to ensure that participants understood the task.  The 
quiz assessed basic understanding of probabilities and how probabilities relate to 
outcomes in lotteries. It also tested whether participants comprehended the computerized 
representations used to display the lotteries. Data for participants who failed the quiz 
were not included in analyses. For dyads, both participants had to pass the quiz for their 
combined data to be included in analysis.  
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For individuals, 47 out of 63 participants passed the quiz in the risky choice task 
and 69 out of 79 participants passed the quiz in the risk management task. For dyads, 
both members passed the quiz in 26 out of 44 dyads in the Risky Choice task and 42 out 
of 56 dyads in the Risk Management task. Although there was considerable variation in 
pass rates, this was not unusual given extensive data on semester-by-semester variability 
in similar studies.  
Materials 
The same twenty-three pairs of monetary lotteries were used (in different ways) as 
stimuli in each of the risky decision making tasks. Each lottery in a pair could result in 
one of two equally probable outcomes, i.e., every lottery was composed of two outcomes, 
each with a 50% chance of occurring.  One lottery in each pair was riskier than the other. 
The riskier lottery had tickets that were farther apart in value, representing more extreme 
potential outcomes.  The less risky lottery had tickets that were more similar in outcome 
value, offering the participants a better functional sense of where they might end up. 
Table 1 shows the complete set of lottery pairs that were used.   
The pairs of lotteries covered a wide range of outcome values from -$300 to 
+$300, and were classified in terms of outcome valences as all negative (NN; loss lottery 
pairs), mixed negative (MN), mixed positive (MP) and all positive (PP; gain lottery 
pairs).  Each outcome valence condition was made up of six lotteries that were factorially 
determined using a 3 x 2 Variance x Relative Expected Value (RelEV) design. Variance 
conditions were defined according to three degrees of ticket separation.  For the high 
variance lottery pairs, the outcomes of the riskier lottery were separated by $200 and the 
outcomes of the less risky lottery were separated by $100.  For the medium variance 
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lottery pairs, the outcomes in the riskier and less risky lotteries were separated by $150 
and $50 respectively. For the low variance lottery pairs, the outcomes in the riskier and 
less risky lotteries were separated by $100 and $0 (zero) respectively.  Relative expected 
value was defined by relative outcome distance from zero. The outcome that is farther 
from zero would count as high relative EV while the outcome closer to zero would count 
as low relative EV.  
  The 3x2 factorial construction of the lottery pairs in each outcome valence set 
was adopted to systematically ensure a comprehensive range of stimuli. Although 
Variance and Relative Expected Value have been analyzed elsewhere (Schneider, 
Hudspeth & Decker, manuscript in preparation), a detailed exploration of these 
influences on decision making are beyond the scope of the thesis.   
Design 
The study used a 2 x 2 x 4 (Decision Maker [individual, dyad] x Task [risky 
choice, risk management] x Outcome Valence [all negative, mixed negative, mixed 
positive, all positive]) Repeated Measures Factorial design. Decision Maker was a 
between-subjects variable representing whether the decisions were being made by an 
individual or a dyad. The data for dyads were collected as part of the Master’s thesis, and 
compared to existing data for individuals (which were collected previously by Schneider, 
Hudspeth, & Decker, manuscript in preparation). Task was also a between-subjects 
variable; some of the subjects completed the Risky Choice task and the remainder 
completed the Risk Management task.  Outcome Valence was a within-subjects variable 
with 4 levels: all negative (NN, losses), mixed negative (MN), mixed positive (MP) and 
  35 
 
Table 1. Lottery Stimuli broken down by Expected Values and Variability 
 
 
  
 
  
 
  Risk Seeking Risk Averse 
 Lottery 
(by 
Trial) 
 
Valence 
Expected 
Values 
Rel 
EV 
Variance Low 
Ticket 
High 
Ticket 
Low 
Ticket 
High 
Ticket 
 B NN -200 High High -300 -100 -250 -150 
 C NN -175 High Medium -250 -100 -200 -150 
 D NN -150 High Low -200 -100 -150 -150 
 E NN -150 Low High -250 -50 -200 -100 
 F NN -125 Low Medium -200 -50 -150 -100 
 G NN -100 Low Low -150 -50 -100 -100 
 H MN -100 High High -200 0 -150 -50 
 I MN -75 High Medium -150 0 -100 -50 
 J MN -50 High Low -100 0 -50 -50 
 K MN -50 Low High -150 50 -100 0 
 L MN -25 Low Medium -100 50 -50 0 
 M MN 0 Low Low -50 50 0 0 
 M MP 0 Low Low -50 50 0 0 
 P MP 25 Low Medium -50 100 0 50 
 Q MP 50 Low High -50 150 0 100 
 R MP 50 High Low 0 100 50 50 
 S MP 75 High Medium 0 150 50 100 
 T MP 100 High High 0 200 50 150 
 U PP 100 Low Low 50 150 100 100 
 V PP 125 Low Medium 50 200 100 150 
 W PP 150 Low High 50 250 100 200 
 X PP 150 High Low 100 200 150 150 
 Y PP 175 High Medium 100 250 150 200 
 Z PP 200 High High 100 300 150 250 
In each experiment, Trial M was presented to participants only once. However, for all 
analyses, the data for Trial M, which has an expected value of Zero, were included twice, 
once to represent the Mixed Negative set and once to represent the Mixed Positive set. 
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all positive (PP, gains). These levels are described in more detail in the Materials 
section. 
The dependent variable was Risk Preference, which was measured as number of 
times out of 6 that the riskier option was selected.  These 6 opportunities correspond to 
the six lottery pair trials within each Outcome Valence condition.   
To minimize potential order effects, eight different stimulus orders were used. 
These orders were systematically manipulated to ensure that each lottery pair would 
appear at the beginning, middle or end of the stimulus sequence for at least some 
participants.  Also, the orders were checked to be sure that similar stimuli did not co-
occur too often, and that the four outcome valence conditions were represented roughly 
evenly throughout the sequence of trials.  
Procedure 
Stimuli presentation and data collection were done via a computer program. 
Twelve computers in the laboratory were set up so that two of those computers would run 
the same order of the lottery at any given time. Participants choosing to sit at those 
matched computers were therefore assigned to work as partners in a dyad. Previously 
unacquainted participants were assigned to dyads in this way to reduce the likelihood that 
relationship dynamics could influence responses. Matched computers were arranged such 
that the partners in a dyad would not face each other. Thus, care was taken to avoid the 
influence of nonverbal communication. A minimum of four participants (two dyads) were 
run in each session to maintain anonymity of partners.  
On entering the lab, participants were instructed to take a seat at any of several 
computers with a lit screen. Instructions regarding the basic task followed, including 
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three practice lotteries which participants completed as individuals. Then participants 
were informed that they would complete the next segment of the study with an 
experimenter-assigned partner as part of a dyad. Each participant would be able to 
communicate with their assigned partner by “chatting” (i.e., sharing of text messages) via 
an Instant Messenger (IM) window on their screen.   
 
 
 
Figure 4. Sample Screen Shot of a Trial in the Risky Choice Task. Dyads 
communicated through an Instant Messenger window (lower left), which remained on 
screen throughout the experiment. Here, Lottery 1 has two tickets -$200 and -$50, each 
of which has a 50% chance of being randomly drawn, resulting in a monetary loss. 
Similarly Lottery 2 has two tickets, -$150 and -$100, each of which has a 50% chance of 
being the outcome in a random draw of this loss lottery. 
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Dyads were instructed to use generic names (e.g., “ExpComp6”) pre-assigned by 
the experimenter to maintain anonymity. Dyads were encouraged to discuss their 
thoughts and reasons behind their impressions of one or the other lottery, and to “explain 
in details why you think a particular lottery is better than the other.” Dyads were also told 
that they must reach an agreement prior to choosing a lottery on the computer. In reality 
though each participant could select whichever lottery they preferred.  (In practice, there 
was only one occasion in which a participant failed to select the lottery that the dyad had 
agreed to choose.) 
Both the Risky Choice and the Risk Management task involved 23 decision trials. 
Figures 4 and 5 show sample screenshots for lottery presentations in the risky choice task 
and risk management tasks respectively. 
Risky choice task.  On each trial in the risky choice task, a pair of lotteries was 
presented on the screen. Each dyad then shared their impressions back and forth via IM 
about which lottery to choose until an agreement was reached.  Then each individual 
responded by clicking on the button beneath the preferred lottery consistent with that 
agreement.   Then the next lottery pair appeared, signaling the next trial. 
Risk management task.  In the risk management task, only one lottery was 
presented on the screen in each trial. Participants’ task was to improve the outcome value 
of one of the two lottery tickets by $50.  Dyad partners shared their impressions with one 
another via IM regarding which ticket to improve until an agreement was reached.  Then 
each individual clicked on the agreed-upon ticket, which increased the face value of that 
potential outcome by $50 (and moved the ticket one column to the right on the lottery 
display). If the dyad selected the lower ticket to improve, the resulting lottery 
  39 
 
corresponded to the low risk lottery (i.e., risk averse choice) from the comparable trial in 
the risky choice task.  If the dyad selected the higher ticket to improve, the result 
corresponded to the high risk lottery (i.e., risk seeking choice). 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Sample Screen Shot of a Trial in the Risk Management Task. Dyads 
communicated through an Instant Messenger window (lower left), which remained on 
screen throughout the experiment.  The lottery has two tickets -$50 and $50, Each ticket 
has a 50% chance of being randomly drawn.  In this task, one of the two tickets can be 
moved to the next higher value on the number line. Moving the low ticket results in a less 
risky lottery with outcomes of $0 and $50, whereas moving the high ticket results in a 
riskier lottery with outcomes -$50 and $100.  
 
After completing the 23 trials of the decision making task, each participant 
independently answered a set of five open-ended questions presented on their computer. 
  40 
 
These questions were designed to explore their thoughts and feelings regarding the nature 
of the task and experience of working with another person. 
  
  41 
 
 
 
Results 
Data from the four studies were combined and analyzed using Repeated Measures 
Analysis of Variance feature of SPSS (PASW – Version 18) in a 2x2x4 (Decision Maker 
[individual, dyad] x Task [risky choice, risk management] x Outcome Valence [all 
negative, mixed negative, mixed positive, all positive]) factorial design. Decision Maker 
was a between-subjects variable representing whether the decisions were being made by 
an individual or a dyad. As mentioned before, the data for dyads were collected as part of 
the Master’s thesis, and compared to existing data for individuals (which were collected 
previously by Schneider, Hudspeth, & Decker, manuscript in preparation). Task was also 
a between-subjects variable; some of the participants completed the Risky Choice task 
and the remainder completed the Risk Management task.  Outcome Valence was a within-
subjects variable with 4 levels: all negative (NN, losses), mixed negative (MN), mixed 
positive (MP) and all positive (PP, gains).  The dependent variable measure of Risk 
Preference was defined as the number of times out of six that the riskier option was 
selected over the safer one.     
Analysis revealed a significant main effect of outcome valence (See Figure 6) on 
risk preference, F(3, 540)=55.07, p<0.05.   The pattern of preferences does not clearly 
follow either PT or SP/A theory, though it has aspects of both. Consistent with prospect 
theory, there seems to be slightly more risk taking on average for loss lotteries than gain 
lotteries, especially in the mixed conditions.  However, consistent with SP/A theory, risk 
  42 
 
preferences were generally on the cautious side; a risk seeking majority was not observed 
in any condition.  
Neither the main effect of Task or Decision Maker was significant.  Decision 
preferences for both the risky choice (M=2.53, SD=1.91) and the risk management 
(M=2.27, SD=1.96) tasks were neutral or slightly on the cautious side,F(1, 180)=1.32, 
n.s.  Similarly, overall, individuals (M=2.49, SD=1.91) and dyads (M=2.17, SD=1.98)  
 
 
Figure 6. Effect of Outcome Valence on Risk Preference 
engaged in similar levels of risk taking, F(1, 180)= 2.69, n.s. Although the main effects 
were not significant, the impact of these variables was evident in interactions.  
The Outcome Valence x Task interaction was significant, F(3, 540)=49.7, p<0.05. 
(See Figure 7).  As expected, there was a cross-over interaction. In the risky choice task, 
preferences were risk averse for gains, whereas preferences were slightly risk seeking for 
losses.  The decision preference pattern in risky choice was consistent with Prospect 
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Theory’s Value Function. Notably though, degree of risk seeking in the negative domain 
was at best modest.  For risk management, the picture was consistent with SP/A theory 
predictions.  Preferences tended to be risk averse for all outcome conditions except for 
 
Figure 7. Effect of Outcome Valence and Task on Risk Preference 
lotteries that guarantee some gain.  There, participants were more willing to take a risk, 
though still not clearly on the side of majority risk taking.   Follow up tests demonstrated 
that differences in risk preferences for the two tasks were statistically significant at every 
level of outcome valence.   
The Outcome Valence x Decision Maker interaction was also significant, F(3, 
540)=3.33, p<0.05. As can be seen in Figure 8, the overall pattern of risk preferences was 
similar at most outcome valences for individuals and dyads.  The one exception was for 
the all negative lotteries, which imply loss of some amount for sure.  When faced with 
this situation, dyads tended to take fewer risks than individuals, and pairwise comparison 
revealed that this difference was statistically reliable, F(1, 182)=8.31, p<0.05. For the 
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other three outcome valence conditions, risk preferences between dyads and individuals 
were not significantly different.  Thus, overall, it appears that dyads’ are more cautious 
than individuals in conditions in which losses are guaranteed, but there was little 
evidence of systematic differences elsewhere. 
 
 
Figure 8. Effect of Outcome Valence and Decision Maker on Risk Preference 
There was no Task x Decision Maker interaction, F(1,180)=0.13, n.s.; nor was 
there a three-way interaction of valence, decision maker, and task, F(3, 540)=0.94, n.s.. 
As can be seen in Figure 9, patterns confirm the two-way interactions observed for 
outcome valence x task and outcome valence x decision maker.  Risk preference patterns 
appear roughly consistent with Prospect Theory predictions for risky choice (Figure 9a) 
and roughly consistent with SP/A Theory predictions for risk management (Figure 9b). 
Dyads and individuals made similar decisions except for guaranteed losses in both tasks, 
when dyads were less willing to take risks.   
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Figure 9. Effect of Outcome Valence, Task and Decision Maker on Risk Preference 
Thus, the overall pattern of results suggests some support for Prospect Theory, 
particularly for the risky choice task, and some support for the SP/A Theory, particularly 
for the risk management task.  There was also some evidence that making decisions with 
a partner influences willingness to take risk, but only when losses were involved. 
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Discussion 
The present work explored the processes of risky decision making in individuals 
and dyads to see whether dyad decision might be subject to social or situational 
influences.  Evidence was examined for the possibility of risky versus cautious shifts, or 
for group polarization effects.  Two different tasks were used in order to see whether 
changes in the decision context would produce different risk-taking strategies.  The 
standard passive risky choice task was expected to engage shallower, psychophysical 
processes, whereas the active risk management task was expected to enlist more self-
relevant motivational and dispositional processes.    
As predicted, the risky choice task led to preferences consistent with prospect 
theory, and the risk management task led to preferences consistent with SP/A theory. 
Thus neither perspective could predict overall preference patterns, but each of the two 
theoretical perspectives was successful in a different task setting.  There was also some 
evidence of the role of social influences in that dyads tended to be more conservative 
than individuals in their decision behavior when dealing with undesirable outcomes.  So a 
cautious shift was observed, but only for lotteries involving losses.  Theoretical 
implications of these findings are discussed next. 
Psychophysical Influences on Risky Decision Making 
Prospect Theory Value Function (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) predicts a risk 
preference pattern of risk aversion for gains and risk seeking for losses.  Additionally 
losses are likely to be experienced as stronger compared to gains of comparable values. 
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Also for both outcome valence domains, marginally decreasing sensitivity would be 
expected.   Overall, in the present work, Prospect Theory predicted results for Risky 
Choice for both individuals and dyads.  However, Prospect Theory’s psychophysical 
explanations could not successfully account for risk decision preferences exhibited by 
individuals and dyads in the risk management task. 
It appears that for the passive risky choice task, the psychophysical and perceptual 
aspects of Prospect Theory are sufficient to predict behavior patterns.  Change of 
reference from gains to losses appeared to influence participants in the Prospect Theory 
predicted direction such that they were generally risk averse for gains and risk seeking for 
losses, though not as risk seeking as might be expected. 
 Further evidence of psychophysical influences can be found in subtleties of the 
risky choice preference pattern across outcome valences.  Decreasing marginal sensitivity 
predicts that reactions should get smaller as outcome value differences move away from 
zero.   Careful review of Figure 7 shows that participants exhibited higher degrees of risk 
aversion and risk seeking respectively when responding to mixed lotteries for gains and 
losses compared to sure gains and sure losses.  Because the outcomes in the all negative 
and all positive conditions were further away from zero, this decrease in sensitivity to 
outcome differences may have weakened risk propensities.   
Thus, it seems that a relatively peripheral level of processing may be adequate to 
make passive choices between given alternatives.  However, preference patterns for the 
risk management task were markedly different, and could not be understood based on 
Prospect Theory’s psychophysical predictions.  This could be because the nature of the 
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risk management task required a greater engagement of mental processes bringing into 
focus motivational and dispositional considerations.   
Dispositional and Motivational Influences on Risky Decision Making 
The Security-Potential/Aspiration Level Theory (Lopes, 1987) predicts an overall 
risk averse behavior pattern for most individuals.  Dispositionally, most people are 
expected to be more inclined towards security (valuing safety more) though some may be 
more inclined toward potential (valuing opportunities more; Schneider and Lopes, 1986).   
According to Lopes, when that sense of security is threatened, most people would avoid 
risk.  
SP/A Theory also considers the impact of a situational factor, aspiration level, on 
risky decision behavior.  On occasions in which no threat to security is experienced, 
aspiration levels might be raised, and the individual could potentially aim for something 
better than the sure thing, or the comparable outcomes, choosing in favor of the riskier 
alternative.  In situations of loss, risks will typically be avoided, with a few exceptions 
involving cases in which specific aspirations encourage consideration of the riskier 
alternative.  In situations in which losses could potentially be avoided (mixed negative), 
occasional risk taking may occur in an effort to maintain the possibility of breaking even.   
Also, in cases of desperation, people may take risks as the only means of potential 
survival.  In these cases, Weber and Milliman (1997) have found evidence that people re-
interpret the technically riskier option as safer one in these kinds of cases. 
This pattern of generally risk-averse preferences was observed for both 
individuals and dyads in the risk management task.  For positive (gain) lotteries, where 
no possibility for loss existed, security was not threatened, and people could potentially 
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have placed more weight on raising their aspiration levels, and meeting those levels. 
Therefore, compared to other outcome valence conditions, some risk taking was 
noticeable for the all positive lotteries.   We hypothesized that this task, relative to risky 
choice, would be more likely to engage subjects, and thus, to involve motivational and 
dispositional processes in addition to psychophysical ones. 
Indirect evidence for higher engagement in the risk management task comes from 
a preliminary coding analysis of the Instant Messenger conversations between dyad 
partners.  About one-third of the participants in the risk management task expressed some 
concern with financial responsibility (about 60% of which focused on losses).  
Statements typically concerned “saving money” or “lowering owed money.”  The issue 
of financial responsibility was never brought up in the conversations between dyad 
partners in the risky choice task.  This is probably another indication that the risk 
management task, though identical to the risky choice task in terms of stimulus materials, 
may have brought into focus motivational factors having to do with action and personal 
accountability.  The opportunity for manipulating outcome values may potentially have 
made participants more aware of their roles in the decision making process, enhancing 
motivation and a sense of responsibility for possible consequences.    
Social Influences on Risky Decision Making 
The risky and cautious shift perspectives predict a shift in group’s (in the present 
study, dyad’s) responses in the risky or cautious direction respectively when compared to 
individual’s decision preferences.  Group polarization concepts on the other hand, 
suggest that dyads are likely to exhibit similar patterns of behavior as majority of 
individuals; only, for groups, these patterns are likely to be more extreme.  This means 
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that if majority of individuals were risk seekers to begin with, dyads would engage in 
even more risk taking, whereas if individuals were risk averse initially, dyads would 
exhibit more pronounced risk aversion tendencies.   
Results do not show reliable differences between individual and dyad preferences 
in all cases.  Only for sure losses, dyads seem to have engaged in significantly less risk 
taking compared to individuals.  This raises the possibility that when the direct threat to 
security was greatest, it became powerful enough in a social context to discourage risk 
taking.  In terms of cautious shift versus group polarization, we can examine the results to 
see which is more likely to have occurred.  If security motivation is what is important, 
then a cautious shift explanation would be supported. 
Given that the preference patterns for risky choice and risk management were 
opposite for the all negative condition, where individual-dyad differences were found, we 
can readily assess which explanation is most fitting.  Individuals exhibited a risk seeking 
majority in risky choice, but a risk averse majority in risk management.  Group 
polarization would predict that the dyads would engage in even greater risk seeking in 
risky choice and greater risk aversion for risk management.  A cautious shift explanation 
would predict that dyads would be more risk averse than individuals in both tasks.  The 
cautious shift explanation was supported because, as Figure 9 shows, the dyads were less 
willing to take risks in the all-negative condition for both tasks.  This is consistent with 
the possibility that security motivation tended to be stronger in interacting dyads than it 
was for individuals.  Nevertheless, this cannot explain why dyads were not more risk 
averse overall. 
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Marquis and Reitz back in 1969 obtained similar findings in a study the effects of 
uncertainty and group discussion on individuals’ willingness to take risks.  Marquis and 
Reitz (1969) found cautious shifts, but only for negative expected values (comparable to 
losses.  However, they also found a risky shift for positive expected values (comparable 
to gains).  Both of these findings are consistent with an SP/A explanation.  Perhaps with 
more power, this type of pattern would also have been observed in the current study. 
The conversational data are also somewhat supportive of a security-based 
description of dyad-individual differences.  A preliminary coding analysis of the Instant 
Messenger conversations showed that dyad participants, in general, tended to talk more 
about losses than anything else.  They also exhibited much concern with worse outcomes, 
and this was particularly evident in the risk management task.  All negative lotteries 
presented decision situations where participants experienced a combined impact of both 
undesirable outcomes.  Therefore, it is possible that dyads felt most vulnerable in these 
situations involving all negative lotteries, and wanted to reduce the unpleasant experience 
of threat by avoiding risk, as best as they could, given the circumstances.  
One interesting point made by some participants came at the end of the study, 
when all participants were asked to respond to several questions regarding their 
experiences about working in dyads.  In response to a question about whether the 
individual participant would have made decisions differently had they been working 
alone (as compared to working as part of a dyad), some of them brought up the point of 
experiencing some concern for the partner’s welfare.  One sample comment was: “… 
since I had a partner, I tried to think of him/her so he/she wouldn't lose money and 
act[ed] more conservatively”.  Thus, when working in a dyad context, participants 
  52 
 
expressed discomfort with risking the loss of other people’s money.  This could be one 
reason why many participants when working as a dyad tended to err on the side of 
caution rather than risk in the negative domain. 
Limitations and Future Directions 
This thesis provides an initial exploration into situational and social influences on 
decision making.  In the future, these variables might be combined into one larger formal 
experiment with random assignment of participants in order to replicate these findings 
with greater control of extraneous variables.  In addition, recruiting larger samples of 
participants would afford additional statistical power to reliably document effects of 
moderate size, especially given the necessity to exclude participants who do not show a 
basic understanding of probabilities or lotteries.  
Future studies might benefit from including a priori measures of risk attitude or 
dispositions.  However, the current findings suggest that this may not be as 
straightforward as some might imagine.  We found that risky decision making patterns 
differ with situations, suggesting that an individual may not have a single overarching 
risk attitude or disposition that transcends situations.  For example, an individual may 
have conservative views towards financial investments and yet be an adventure sports 
enthusiast, indicating that risk dispositions may vary with respect to different domains or 
situations in real life. In addition, even the interpretation of riskiness may not always be a 
point of agreement across individuals, or between researchers and participants. 
Future research comparisons might also go beyond individual versus dyad to 
include other comparisons that could bring in teams and/or groups of different types and 
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sizes. Exploring different types of social interactions as well as different settings for those 
interactions may be key to understanding real world decision making. 
Finally, the present work suggests the need for an overarching theory to connect 
the gap between psychophysical, motivational, dispositional and social (not to mention 
cognitive) processes to successfully predict general patterns of risky decision behavior 
across decision situations and social settings.  One promising direction has been taken in 
dual process perspectives of decision making.  It has been increasingly accepted by 
decision theorists and researchers that risky decision making processes may involve two 
different systems of processing of information (Damasio, 1994; Epstein, 1994; Evans, 
2010; Finucane, Peters, & Slovic, 2003; Hogarth, 2001; Kahneman, 2003; Lieberman, 
2000; Reyna, 2004; Stanovich & West, 2000).  One system is hypothesized to involve 
relatively superficial processes, which are heuristic-based and involve easy or automatic 
rules for quickly responding to familiar situations.  The other system involves deeper 
conscious processes, which are analytical in nature and involve a systematic evaluation of 
the decision situation.  The nature of task situations may play a role in determining how 
these systems interact, and therefore influence both the decision process and resulting 
behavior.  
The risky choice task, for example, may be one situation in which heuristic 
approaches may be sufficient to make risk-related decisions, whereas the risk 
management task may be a situation in which a different heuristic or a more analytical 
approach is needed.   There may be many different default heuristics depending on the 
type of decision situation, assuming that the situation feels familiar.  For unfamiliar 
situations, a more analytic approach may be needed (e.g., Stanovich & West, 2000).  
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Social situations may place additional constrains on decision strategies.  In real life, there 
are many different kinds of decision situations that are likely to be more or less familiar.  
Determining how the tradeoff between these two systems occurs may help us resolve 
when these different theories may come into play.  Advances in neuroscience are likely to 
be particularly informative in making progress along these lines. 
Decision researchers may sometimes seem to forget that in real life, we often 
make decisions with different people in different sets of circumstances and that these 
characteristics define decision situations.  A comprehensive understanding of human 
decision making processes requires sensitivity to the many different kinds of social and 
contextual influences that may be at work in different decision situations.  
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